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ARTICLES
ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FISHERY
MANAGEMENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE UN CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS
MAX COLLETTt

This article is a critical analysis of Canadian and international management
strategies for the Northwest Atlantic straddling fish stock. The article examines whether the proposed UN amendments to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 Convention) provisions concerning
straddling fish stocks effectively respond to the fundamental problems faced
thus far, and whether these proposed changes are likely to be acceptable to
the international community. The author submits that Canada and other na tions should endorse and ratify the proposed amendments to the 1982
Convention in light of the fact that the amendments introduce substantive
ecosystem approaches to fishery managem;nt and clarify the role and powers
ofpresently existing and future international fishery organizations.
Cet article analyse critiquement des strategies de gestion des stocks de poisson
qui chevauchent les zones des 200 milles des pays de !'At/antique du Nord.
L 'article se demande si les modifications proposees a la Troisieme
Convention de l'ONU sur le droit de la mer concernant ces stocks de poisson
repondent ejfectivement aux problemes fondamentaux rencontres jusqu 'ici.
L 'article se demande par ailleurs si ces modifications seront acceptables a la
communaute internationale. L 'auteur suggere que le Canada et des autres
pays devraient approuver et ratifier les modifications proposees parce qu 'elles
introduisent des strategies de gestion qui repondent aux besoins de l'ecosysteme et qui clarifient le role et les pouvoirs des organisations internationaux
de peche, y compris celles qui existent et celles qui seront etablies a l'avenir.

t B.A. (British Columbia), LL.B. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie).
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The legislation is a national emergency measure pending
the development of a permanent international solution,
providing effective controls for high seas fisheries. The
legislation gives the Government of Canada the legal
authority to make regulations for the conservation of ...
"straddling" stocks. 1
The ancient concept of freedom of the seas can and must
be transformed into a modern and progressive ideal of
rational international cooperation to ensure that irreversible ecological harm to the oceans does not become
our contribution to our common future. 2

The history of Canadian and international fisheries management in
the Northwest Atlantic reveals the inadequacy of the current fisheries regime as provided for in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea. 3
Canada has advocated management of Atlantic high seas and
straddling stock4 fisheries in accordance with the 1982 Convention.
Beyond its 200-mile Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ), Canada supports
and participates in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(N AFO), an international fisheries
organization (IFO) that
cooperatively manages high seas fish resources. NAFo's conservation
and management measures reflect customary legal regimes for
fisheries management, and to date have been deficient in managing
and conserving straddling fish stocks. Consequently, Atlantic fish
stocks have severely suffered from overfishing, forcing the
Canadian government to apply drastic domestic and international
measures. Two significant government actions include a
1 Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-20, "An Act to Amend the
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 1994" Qune 1994).
2 J. Carr & M. Gianni, "High Seas Fisheries, Large-Scale Drift Nets, and the
Law of the Sea" in J.M. Van Dyke, D. Zelke & G. Hewison, eds., Freedom of the
Seas in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) [hereinafter
Freedom] 272 at 287.
3 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261
[hereinafter 1982 Convention].
4 Straddling fish stocks are those stocks whose natural migration patterns exceed
the political seaward boundaries established by the exclusive economic zone (EEZJ.
E. Meltzer, "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks:
The Non-sustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries" (1994) 25 O.D.I.L. 255 at
256-57.
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moratorium on all major cod fisheries inside Canada's EFz5 and
amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 6 to enable
control and arrest of foreign fishing vessels in the NAFO regulatory
area that disregard NAFO conservation measures.7 Currently,
Canada seeks international recognition for its decision to take
"emergency legislative measures" with regard to the remaining fish
stocks.
There is an urgent need to clarify and strengthen, through international cooperation and negotiation, the implementation of the
1982 Convention provisions on high seas fishery management, and
in particular, straddling stock management. 8 The international
5 The moratorium on all of the major cod fisheries inside Canada's EFZ was
announced on December 20, 1993 in Canada's Atlantic Groundftsh Management
Plan for 1994. Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-14E, "The
Fisheries Crisis in the Northwest Atlantic" (May 1994).
6 An Act to Amend Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, S.C. 1994, c. 14 amending
R.S. 1985, c. C-33.
The amendment to the Act enables the Government of Canada to make
regulations for the conservation of specific straddling stocks by (i) listing the
straddling stocks to be protected; (ii) establishing the conservation and management
measures that will apply on the high seas to protect the listed stocks; and (iii) listing
the classes of foreign vessels to which these measures will apply. The legislation also
provides for the use of force if necessary to arrest vessels, and for regulations setting
out the procedures for the responsible use of force. Government of Canada, supra
note 1.
7 Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., c. 413, as am. by SORL94-362.
This amendment lists the straddling stocks, two classes of vessels (vessels without
nationality and vessels from listed States) and the conservation measures needed to
implement the prohibition of any person on a foreign vessel from fishing for any
listed straddling stocks contrary to listed conservation measures. Vessels from the
listed States are vessels operating under "flags of convenience" that fish or have
recently fished in the NAFO Regulatory Area in disregard of NAFO conservation
measures.
8 The straddling stock problem is a global problem: Canada is just one of an
estimated 15 coastal states facing straddling stock problems because of unregulated
high seas fishing. Other stocks needing management include pollock in the "Donut
Hole" of the Bering Sea and the "Peanut Hole" of the Sea of Okhotsk; orange
roughy on the Challenger Plateau in the high seas off the coast of New Zealand;
hake, southern blue whiting and squid off Argentina's Patagonian Shelf; jack
mackerel off the coast of Chile and Peru; cod in the Barents Sea "Loop Hole" off
the coast of Norway; yellowfin and skipjack runa which Mexico views as a
straddling stock problem; and in the South Pacific Ocean, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, highly migratory stocks of tuna, dolphin, and shark.
Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-18 "Global Overview of
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" Qune 1994); Oceans Institute of
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community is seeking to address problems associated with high seas
fisheries in several conferences,9 including the UN Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. 10
This paper will examine the straddling stock management issue
and the current proposals to resolve the problem in three parts.
First, the paper will summarize problems experienced by NAFO in
its implementation of management regimes in accord with the
1982 Convention. Second, the paper will examine whether the most
recent draft agreement 11 for the Conference adequately and extensively addresses numerous criticisms of the 1982 Convention, as
well as unresolved disputes between coastal states and distant water
fishing states (DWFSs). Third, the paper will examine whether the
draft agreement will likely be endorsed by the international community. Finally, this paper will assess whether Canada should accept the draft agreement and ratify the 1982 Convention. I submit
that Canada's long-term interest in the development of effective
and internationally acceptable management measures for straddling
stocks necessitates that Canada adopt the Agreement's advocacy of
IFO-based management regimes. The Canadian government should
seek to resolve the straddling stock management problem by sup-

s

Canada, Managing Fishery Resources Beyond 200 Miles: Canada Options to Protect
Northwest Atlantic Straddling Stocks (Halifax: Fisheries Council of Canada, 1990)
at 11-13.
9 Two other conferences and one Agreement have been initiated to address the
high seas fishery crisis: the "International Conference on Responsible Fishing," held
May 1992 in Cancun; the "FAO Technical Consultations on High Seas Fishing,"
held September 1992 in Rome; and the "United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization Compliance Agreement" of November 1993. The latter agreement
requires parties to it to control their vessels to prevent any activity that undermines
conservation measures established by IFOs. The Canadian Government considers the
latter agreement to be a major breakthrough in providing international
recognition that all states must comply with IFO measures. Government of Canada,
Press Release B-HQ-94-15E "Conservation of Fish Stocks on the High Seas-The
Evolving International Legal Framework" (May 1994); Meltzer, supra note 4 at
324.
1 Convened through UNGA Res. 47/192, 22 December 1992, pursuant to the
directive in Par. 17.50, Chapter 17, Agenda 21 [hereinafter the Conference].
11 Chairman Sarya Nandan's "Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" (23 August 1994) [hereinafter the
Agreement].

°
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porting international cooperative regimes rather than by extending
unilaterally the jurisdictional authority of coastal states.

I. THE 1982 CONVENTION FISHERY
MANAGEMENT REGIME

The 1982 Convention hoped to establish effective fishery management regimes by enclosing fisheries within two clearly demarcated
ocean areas: 200 nautical mile coastal state exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) and the high seas. Theoretically, the EEZ provides
globally uniform jurisdictions in which coastal states hold sovereign
exploitive rights and concurrent conservation obligations. 12
Although the concept is a politically-defined maritime boundary, early advocates of the EEZ concept believed enclosure of the
oceans encouraged a more rational management of resources since
the vast majority of living and non-living resources presently exploitable are situated within 200 miles of coastline. 13 The concept
was popular to both developed and developing nations, 14 and states
12

Article 56 gives a coastal state sovereign rights within its EEZ for the purposes
of exploring and exploiting, and conserving and managing living resources of the
seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. Under Article 61, the coastal state is given
management and enforcement responsibilities, rights, and interests over the living
resources in the EEZ. The coastal state's rights within this region are quite extensive,
including the regulation and control of fisheries and other resources, the right to
make and enforce legislation over the economic exploitation of resources of the
zone, and protect it against pollution and other hazards
l3 Over 94% of the world fish catch, virtually all oil and gas deposits presently
exploitable, and 80% of marine scientific research is conducted within the region.
See M. Dhamani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 22.
14 The concept was widely popular; developing coastal states advocated the
concept as a means to greater control over resources (either through direct fishing
by their nationals, or through controlling foreign fishing and obtaining some
revenue through licence fees or contractual access to fishing technology). Moreover,
in the words of the originator of the concept, the goal of an EEZ was to provide a
"defensive mechanism to safeguard Africa's and developing countries' [and coastal
state] interests in an increasingly hostile and acquisitive marine environment." F.
Njenga, "Historical Background of the Evolution of the Exclusive Economic Zone
and the Contribution of Africa" in G. Pontecorvo, ed., The New Order of the
Oceans: The Advent of a Managed Environment (New York: Columbia University,
1986) 125 at 134.
The concept was also attractive to economically developed states who sought
greater access to fisheries and were skeptical of IFO abilities to effectively regulate
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quickly declared EEZS and EFZs. Accordingly, the concept became
part of customary international law prior to the conclusion of the
1982 Convention. 15
With regard to high seas management, Article 118 of the 1982
Convention mandates the multilateral creation of IFOs to cooperatively manage and conserve high seas resources. This provision, in
conjunction with several other "obligation" provisions, 16 theoretically limits DWFS access to high seas resources.17
fishing. Maritime powers and DWFSs were also encouraged by the establishment of
clearly defined and uniform territorial jurisdictions which, it was hoped, would
eliminate the jurisdictional "creep" threat to the navigational freedoms of maritime
states. See R. R. Churchill & A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester:
Manchester University, 1988) at 231; T. McDorman, "Will Canada Ratify the Law
of the Sea Convention?" (1988) 25 San Diego L. Rev. 535 at 547; F. Vicuna, The
Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 238.
l5 By 1974, 74 States had claimed an EEZ and 15 States an EFZ, plus, by 1985, the
International Court ofJustice stated that it is "incontestable that ... the institution
of the exclusive economic zone ... is shown by the practice of States to have become
a part of customary law." Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta),
[1985] I.C.J. Rep. 13 at para. 34 as cited in Vicuna, supra note 14 at 238.
16 Article 87 states that "The high seas are open to all States" and this freedom
includes the "freedom of fishing." However, this freedom is subject to being
exercised by all states "with due regard for the interests of other States." Article 116
also makes the right to fish subject to treaty obligations and the "the rights and
duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in Article 63,
paragraph 2, and Articles 64 to 67" [articles concerning inter-zonal species]. Article
117 explicitly provides that all states have a duty to take, or to cooperate with other
states in taking appropriate enforcement measures for their respective nationals as is
necessary for the conservation of the fishery resources.
17 Traditionally, customary international law since the 18th century considered
fish in the high seas to be "free," both res nullius and res communis on the basis that
the waters were not susceptible to effective occupation, that the resources were
inexhaustible, and that a specific use of the oceans did not impair other uses. A. W.
Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries
Organizations (London: Fishing News, 1973) at 16.
By the mid-20th century such notions were both antiquated and politically
outdated. They were antiquated in the sense that the development of technology
resulted in greatly expanded resource-harvesting techniques in various fishery and
resource industries. They were politically outdated in the sense that the freedom of
the seas notion was developed in support of colonial desires for the seas to be
considered international highways for efficient communication and commerce.
However, this view of the high seas benefited only those nations who could access
high seas resources. This select group did not include many of the newly indepedent
developing States. Njenga, supra note 14 at 127, 134.
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The 1982 Convention recognizes that the 200-mile regime does
not satisfactorily address the management of several inter-zonal
species that migrate seasonally or during their life-cycles.
Accordingly, Article 63.2 mandates the establishment of IFOs to
reduce ambiguities concerning who manages fish stocks that straddle both an EEZ and the high seas. Article 63.2 directs both coastal
and high seas states "fishing for such stocks to agree directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in
the adjacent area."

II.

NAFO: A MODEL FISHERY BODY UNDER THE
1982 CONVENTION

NAFO was seen by its members 18 and the international community
as an early effort to implement the spirit of cooperation called for
in Articles 63(2) and 118 of the 1982 Convention. 19 NAFO was established as a consequence of the extension of coastal jurisdiction
by Canada and the United States in 1977. Its mandate is to
contribute through consultation and cooperation to the
optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of the fishery resources of the Convention Area.
NAFO promotes contemporary ideas for international
collaboration in the high seas based on the scientific research fundamentals. 20

NAFO manages an area called the Regulatory Area, which is that
part of the Convention Area which lies beyond the areas in which
coastal states exercise fisheries jurisdiction. 21
18 NAFO currently has 15 contracting parties: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark
(with respect to the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Estonia, the European Union
(EU), Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and the
Russian Federation. Government of Canada, supra note 5.
19 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries [hereinafter NAFO Convention], NAFO Handbook (Dartmouth: The
Headquarters of NAFO, 1994) at preamble; B. Applebaum, "The Straddling Stocks
Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for
Coastal State Action" (paper prepared for the 23rd Annual Conference of the Law
of the Sea Institute, 12-15 June 1987, Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands) at
3, 14; Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 25.
2o NAFO Convention, ibid. at introduction.
21 Ibid. at Article 1.2.
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Six of the ten identified fish stocks in the NAFO Regulatory
Area are defined as "straddling stocks" as their biomass "straddle"
the Canadian 200-mile EFZ limit. 22 NAFo's management structure
provides a forum for cooperation among contracting parties with
regard to the study, appraisal and exchange of scientific information and views relating to the fisheries of the Convention Area.23
Furthermore, on the basis of advice from scientists who represent
member states, NAFO sets total allowable catch (TAC) limits, establishes other conservation measures, and allocates quotas to NAFO
contracting parties for the listed managed stocks. 24

III. PROBLEMS FACED BY NAFO IN
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING STOCKS
Currently, the Northwest Atlantic straddling fish stocks are in a
precarious state. The NAFO Scientific Council has reported that the
southern Grand Banks cod stock is at the lowest level recorded, and
total allowable catches of groundfish across the Canadian EFZ have
declined 75% since 1988. 25 Consequently, in 1992 the Canadian
government declared a moratorium on the fishing of northern cod,
Atlantic Canada's most important commercial fish stock. In 1993
all major cod fisheries within Canada's EFZ were closed and quotas
for most other groundfish species were sharply restricted. Since
1993, NAFO has also imposed moratoria on certain stocks in its
Regulatory Area in order to be consistent with Canada's conservation decisions.
There are a number of factors 26 causing the present decline.
However, it is generally agreed that overfishing and irresponsible
fishing by the Canadian offshore trawler fleet and the foreign fishery outside the 200 miles limit have been critical destructive factors.27

22 Applebaum, supra note 19 at 2; Meltzer, supra note 4 at 297.
23

Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 27.

25

Government of Canada, supra note 5.

24 Ibid. at 17-18; Government of Canada, supra note 5.
26 Other causes include human-induced distortions in predator/prey

relationships and environmental factors (decreasing water temperatures, oceanic
salinity changes). Meltzer, supra note 4 at 297.
27 Ibid. at 297; Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at preface.
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From a Canadian perspective, the critical problem with NAFo's
present management structure is its inability to regulate and enforce
the TACs and quotas allocated to its member states, as well as to
regulate non-member fishing states. This is particularly important
to Canada since important stocks of cod, flounder and redfish have
been over-exploited outside of Canada's Grand Banks, on what is
known as the Nose and Tail.
NAFo's problems can be summarized as follows: (i) the susceptibility of conservation strategies to domestic pressures of member
parties; (ii) the ability of members to object to assigned TACs which
permits unilateral setting of quotas; and (iii) the inability of NAFO
members to effectively impose conservation measures on member
and non-member fishing vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area.
1. Ineffective Conservation Strategies:

Article II of the NAFO Convention establishes that parties are to cooperatively manage resources by following standards set by the
Scientific Council and managed by the Fisheries Commission. In
establishing fish quotas, Article 11 subparagraphs 2 and 3 state that
the Fisheries Commission should "achieve the optimum utilization
of the fishery resources of the Regulatory Area" as qualified by the
need for consistency between coastal state and Regulatory Area
quotas. However, critics have noted that term "optimum utilization" does not provide assistance for states in determining allowable
catches. 28 Consequently, the potential for dispute as to the appropriate measurement allows states to justify a variety of conservation
measures, including measures to satisfy short-term economic interests. 29 The conflict between the European Union CEU) and NAFO
demonstrates that the lack of common agreement as to proper
management reference points severely hinders NAFO objectives.
Between 1979 and 1985, NAFO parties abided by TACs set by
NAFO that were determined in accord with what Applebaum calls
the "two pillars" of the conservation structure: a "conservative" conservation in the setting of TACs in the form of "F.O.l," 30 and the
28

Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 32.
Ibid. at 33; FAO Fisheries Department., FAO Technical Consultation on High
Seas Fishing FIPL/484 (Suppl.) (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 1992) at 38 [hereinafter FAO].
30 F.0.1 is a means to set TACS at a level below the "maximum sustainable yield"
(MSYl in order to provide a cautionary barrier that minimizes dangers inherent in
29
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maintenance of traditional proportionate shares for the member
countries. 31
In 1985, the EU changed its position, claiming that NAFO reference points were (i) unduly restrictive, (which resulted in the loss of
previous catches), and (ii) failed to recognize the Communities' socio-economic problems. 32 The EU subsequently refused to be bound
by NAFO conservation reference points, and established its own
Maximum Sustainable Yield quotas on an Fmax basis. These levels
were consistently set above both NAFO quotas 33 and the EU member
states' historical stock share.
The domestic problems referred to by the EU as the motivating
force for disputing NAFO stock quotas included the scheduled entrance of Spain and Portugal into the EU. The entrance of these two
states considerably expanded the total number of EU fishermen and
led to a 75% increase in fishing capacity, a 45% rise in production
for human consumption, and a 43% increase in fish consumption in
the enlarged Community.34 The inclusion of Spain and Portugal
also implied that the EU allocation would be divided amongst more
states, lessening proportional harvests of member states.35
2. NAFO Objection Procedures
The ability of the EU to accommodate its domestic pressures by
objecting to NAFo's management reference points and using an alternative, higher yielding measurement, was sanctioned by NAFO
Convention objection procedures. Article XII of the NAF o
Convention permits any contracting party to object to and not
the possibility of errors in scientific assessments of stocks and provide consistency in
the annual catches.
31 Supra note 19 at 3.
32 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 39.
33 The EUs 1989 quota for the NAFO fishery was set at 160,000 tons, 12 times
higher than the 13,000 tons allocated by NAFO. Total 1990 EU catches from NAFO
managed stocks were estimated to be five times higher than the quotas "officially"
allocated, and almost three times the Eu's autonomous quotas. Meltzer, supra note 4
at 299.
34 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 39.
35 Evelyn Meltzer has also noted that another change in internal EU problems led
to further increases in unilateral quotas in 1990; the EU increase in 1990 coincided
with Namibia's extension of jurisdiction which displaced many Spanish and
Portuguese vessels that fished those waters. These same vessels transferred there
efforts to the Canadian Grand Banks, either under EU flags or reflagged as noncontracting parties to the NAFO area. See supra note 4 at 299.
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comply with Council proposals and "binding" measures.36 From
1986 onwards, the EU repeatedly used the objection procedure so as
to not comply with most of the management measures adopted
annually by the NAFO Fisheries Commission.

3. Enforcement Measures
Article XVII authorizes flag states to impose sanctions for violations
"as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of the
Convention and to implement any measures which become binding .... " The imposition of sanctions is ineffective if the flag state,
such as the EU, objects to the binding measure.
Moreover, these enforcement measures permit many non-NAFOmember fishing state vessels as well as member state vessels flying
"flags of convenience" to harvest fish stocks in the NAFO Area with
impunity and without regard to NAFO conservation measures.37
Thus, the NAFO Convention uses vague terms to guide the establishment of TACs, permits states to object to its conservation
measures, and relies on flag state enforcement. This has permitted,
and even legitimized, overfishing, which makes NAFO an ineffective
management regime.
IV. DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE
1982 CONVENTION

NAFo's inability to resolve internal member disputes and to enforce
coastal management regimes highlight IFO problems under the
1982 Convention provisions. The following is a brief analysis of the
inadequacies of the 1982 Convention.
First, the EEZ/high seas demarcation of jurisdictions does not
address what Arvid Pardo calls the "inclusive" nature of fish.3 8
36 NAFO Convention, supra note 19 at
37 These nations include: the United

20.
States, Mexico, Chile, Panama, Mauritania,
Venezuela, the Cayman Islands and South Korea. Ibid. at 299; Oceans Institute,
supra note 8 at 30.
3 8 A. Pardo suggests that the 1982 Convention provisions create "100 different
sovereignties of management" that provide well for exclusive uses of the sea but do
not adequately govern inclusive uses of the sea, including management of migratory
stocks." To Pardo, these provisions guarantee a permissive freedom, a negative
freedom that encourages the use of the sea without responsibility for its
consequences. In contrast, the author suggests that what is needed is a positive

12
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Although a great majority of fishery activity does occur within the
EEZ limits, the 1982 Convention conveys the impression that most
fish stocks confine themselves to the EEZ of a single coastal state.
This impression is simplistic and inadequate as the nature of fish is
to migrate, often well beyond the 200-mile jurisdiction of the
coastal state. 39 Since coastal state conservation and management
regimes are enforceable only on fishing activities within the 200mile jurisdiction, the functional effectiveness of straddling stock
conservation measures is severely impaired. As an example, roughly
10% of the Grand Banks extend beyond Canada's EFZ, and many
stocks straddle Canada's EFZ waters into two geographical areas referred to as the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks. Under the 1982
Convention EEZ regime, Canada cannot enforce its conservation
measures on these stocks or those fishermen harvesting these stocks
beyond its EFZ.
Second, the 1982 Convention relies on states to establish IFOs
for high seas management. Based on the fact that most IFOs are reactive institutions, in the sense of being organized in order to respond to a management crisis, the provisions have the effect of
severely compromising the fishery resource needing management.4°

freedom, permitting use of the seas with positive duties to manage what is to be
utilized. See A. Pardo, "Perspectives on Ocean Governance" in Freedom, supra note
2 at 39.
39 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 14 at 234; Dhamani, supra note 13 at 156.
4 ° Fisheries have historically been allowed to develop relatively unmonitored
until the resource industry reaches a crisis stage, demonstrated by overcapitalization,
excess capaciry, intensive competition, decline in catches, and/or a negative and
severe impact on non-target species. J. Carr & M. Gianni "High Seas Fisheries,
Large-Scale Drift Nets, and the Law of the Sea" in Freedom, supra note 2, 272 at
287.
Moreover, IFOs have had limited success once established; few IFOs have access to
independent research staffs, and hence are reliant on national scientists who disagree
on the appropriate scientific data to be used. Also, as NAFO demonstrates, IFOs are
rarely given the competence to regulate the fisheries directly, and hence have had
their recommendations defied and enforcement procedures negated by flag state
non-cooperation. W. Burke "Unregulated High Seas Fishing and Ocean
Governance" in Freedom supra note 2, 235 at 244.
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V. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO 1982
CONVENTION

There is considerable discussion concerning changes needed to the
1982 Convention in order effectively to address the straddling
stock management problem. The discussion has focussed on three
problem areas: (i) a need for an ecosystem framework and clarification of IFO management guidelines; (ii) the need for a precise definition of competencies between coastal states and DWFSs within the
management structure of an IFO; (iii) elaboration and clarification
of the respective legal rights and obligations of coastal states,
DWFSs, and IFO managerial bodies.
1. Clear Guidelines Mandating Ecosystem Management Regimes
IFOs need guidelines for adopting conservation measures with respect to high seas fisheries. 41 As discussed earlier, the uncertainty as
to what constitutes "optimum management" permits states to
dispute what constitutes "scientific data" and what is an
"unreasonable catch." In turn, this uncertainty permits policy-makers to appease domestic fishery interests by setting high TACs. New
reference points need to be developed and agreed to which establish
acceptable and biologically safe impact levels. These reference
points must not only be based on a single-species approach but also
be part of a strategy that includes multi-species and ecosystem realities.42
Article 119 of the 1982 Convention recognizes that fishery
management decisions must be made on uncertain and limited information when it stipulates that states "shall take measures which
are designed on the best scientific evidence available." This was designed so that states would not continue to fish in an unregulated
fashion with the pretext of incomplete information.

4l

Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 33

42 The management reference points must be set with regard to numerous
factors, such as the need for a selective catch via controls on various gear used in
different areas in different seasons so as to account and allow for the reproductive
requirements of stocks, both target and non-target. The reference points should
permit reproduction and regeneration of stocks. Similar ideas must be applied to
ensure reduced capture of non-target stocks, endangered species, species in
"protected" stages such as times of spawning or juvenile stages. FAO, supra note 29 at
53.

14

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

This provision is insufficient: states have taken advantage of the
opportunity to disagree on what is deemed "evidence" and "best."
Hence, changes and elaborations to the 1982 Convention must
clarify what approach is to be taken in regard to these uncertainties,
and whether a precautionary approach should be taken when there is a
lack of definitive information.
2. Precise Definition of Competencies Between Coastal States
and DWFSs, Under the Umbrella of an IFO
IFOs are a meeting point for the divergent interests of coastal states
and DWFSS. In order for states successfully to establish IFOs to manage competing interests, a globally applicable document such as the
1982 Convention should provide constructive guidelines on the establishment of management procedures, allocation factors, and enforcement mechanisms.
The FAO has examined the requirements necessary for a successful IFO. Key factors that should be included in a UN Convention
providing guidelines for states to establish an effective IFO include
provisions mandating the need for:
a clearly defined and mutually accepted purpose for
the IFO.
0
mechanisms for the timely, accurate and complete
supply of scientific data by members.
" neutral and impartial IFO Councils.
0
agreement by parties to immediately adopt effort
levels determined by IFO Councils.
0
clarification of flag State responsibility.
0
clearly defined and operable dispute resolution procedures.43
0

3. Clarification of Legal Rights and Obligations
The combination of flag state powers and the lack of clarity in
Article 63(2) of the 1982 Convention demonstrate that future elaboration on the straddling stock problem must address who has authority to impose conservation measures, on whom, and to what
degree. Presently, authors who have sought to find a legal justification to permit coastal state and IFO enforcement of conservation
measures on foreign vessels fishing a managed stock must make
43 FAO, supra note 29 at 45-51.
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lengthy and speculative arguments. This reveals the need for a clarification of powers.44
As an example, Burke and Miles suggest that if it is accepted
that the 1982 Convention was designed to create single management units (EEZS or IFOs), then Article 87.2 ("freedom to fish") can
and should be qualified by Articles 63.2, 118 (duty to adopt conservation measures) and Article 56 (coastal states have sovereign
rights over the resources within their EEZ). The authors allege that
this interpretation gives authority for coastal states to preserve their
EEZ sovereign rights by restricting high seas fishing where they can
show (i) a relationship between the stocks inside and outside the
EEZ, and (ii) that conservation measures on the high seas are necessary for efficient conservation of the fishery within the EEZ. 45
VI. THE UN CONFERENCE
The UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks has a mandate to address the problems
identified thus far.46
44 See Applebaum, supra note 19; K. Sullivan, "Conflict in the Management of a
Northwest Atlantic Transboundary Cod Stock" (1989) 13 Marine Pol'y 118; C.
Joyner, "Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for Straddling Stocks and
the International Law of Fisheries" (1993) 24 O.D.I.L. 99; see especially E. Miles
& W. Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks"
(1989) 20 O.D.I.L. 343 [hereinafter "Pressures"]; and W. Burke, "Fishing in the
Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of Fisheries"
(1989) 16 Ecological L.Q. 285 [hereinafter "Donut"].
45 "Donut," ibid. at 302.
46 Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 states that the Conference will be organized to
promote effective implementation of 1982 Convention provisions by (i) identifying
and assessing existing conservation and management problems of such fish stocks,
and (ii) formulating means of improving cooperation on fisheries which are
consistent with the Convention provisions. UNCED, Agenda 21: Prog-ramme ofAction
for Sustainable Development (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1993)
155. See also The Chairman's "A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference
Prepared by the Chairman" (UN Doc. NCONF. 164/10 (24 June 1993), para. 12)
as found in Payoyo, infta note 60.
It should be noted that the UN Conference was not the first international meeting
in which there were proposals to clarify the ambiguities of the 1982 Convention;
during UNCLOS III, Canada and other coastal States were dissatisfied with Article 63
and submitted a compromise proposal that gave a mandate for tribunal-based
resolution of conservation measures for straddling stocks. The aim was to
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The Conference has completed three sessions, with a final session scheduled in the spring of 1995. Chairman Satya Nandan's
draft Agreement seeks to resolve contentious issues remaining at the
end of the second and third sessions. Evelyne Meltzer, who attended the organizational and substantive sessions of the
Conference as a representative of UN Association in Canada, summarized the outstanding problems after the second session as follows. A critical issue of debate between coastal states and the DWFSS
concerns whether the coastal state should be recognized as having a
special interest in ensuring that measures on the high seas are compatible with their adjacent EEZ measures. Many DWFSs argue that
fish stocks should be managed as a biological unit, and not be divided among political boundaries.47 Many coastal states consider
this position as an unjustifiable interference with their EEZ sovereign
rights. Second, there remains concern for the nature of flag state responsibility over vessels on the high seas. Third, although most
states agreed that the precautionary principle should be implemented as a management tool, greater definition of the concept is
needed. Fourth, states disagreed on the implications of the
Conference; coastal states want a legally binding convention while
DWFSs want general recommendations for straddling stock management that are to apply within and beyond the EEZ. 48

encourage consistency between EEZ conservation and the measures to be established
by the tribunal. This was not adopted. Again, at the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) the Santiago Group of over 40 likeminded states concerned with the status of high seas living resources introduced a
document, A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.Il/L.16/Rev.l, that sought to consolidate and
codify the customary international law regarding management principles for
fishing on the high seas and introduce conservation, management, and enforcement
measures. This proposal was excluded from the Agenda 21 text because it was not
unanimously accepted. However, as a compromise, the UN Conference was
established. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.114, (13 April 1982); Meltzer, supra
note 4 at 323.
47 Ibid at 326.
4 8 On a more positive note, the PAO successfully developed an agreement on the
issue of flagging and reflagging of fishing vessels on the high seas. See "Agreement
to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas." The Agreement was adopted in
1993 and will enter force with the 25th instrument of acceptance. Ibid at 326.
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VII. EVALUATION OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT
The following analysis examines the Chairperson's Draft
Agreement. It will critically examine the document by evaluating
how well it responds to the criticisms noted earlier regarding the
vagueness of responsibilities found in the 1982 Convention, and the
disputes remaining at the UN Conference. This will entail an exami. nation of the Agreement's provisions in four parts: (i) general principles applicable to fishery management regimes; (ii) rights and duties of officials of IFOs, flag states, and all fishing states; (iii) dispute
settlement procedures; and (iv) resolution of allocation issues.

1. General Principles
The preamble to the Agreement states that all parties are to take
note that cooperation between parties has been lacking, that the
problems identified in Agenda 21, chapter 17 must be addressed, 4 9
and that more effective enforcement measures must be adopted for
the conservation and management of such stocks.
The Agreement considerably enhances aspects of an ecosystem
management framework found in the 1982 Convention. In so doing, the Agreement includes and adopts what David VanderZwaag
calls an "integrated" approach to international cooperation and coordination. An approach is integrated when it harmonizes management at regional and global levels by addressing the competing uses
and effects of resource utilization on the larger ocean ecosystem.so
Moreover, the Agreement accommodates the growing belief that a
guideline document such as the Agreement needs to mandate that
states take a multi-species and regional approach to fishery management.SI
49 Problems identified include: inadequate management of stocks, overutilization
of some resources, problems of unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive
fleet size, vessels reflagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear,
unreliable databases and a lack of sufficient cooperation between states. See
preamble to draft Agreement.
so "The Concept and Principles of Sustainable Development: 'Rio-formulating'
Common Law Doctrines and Environmental Laws" (1993) 13 Windsor Y.B. Access
Just. 39 at 44-45.
SI Several ecological and NGO groups attending the UN Conference are
enthusiastic about the draft Agreement's extensive assertion of ecosystem principles.
See "Joint NGO Statement to the Final Plenary of the Third Substantive Session of
the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly Migratory Fish Stocks"
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The Agreement repeats Article 119 ("the best scientific evidence
available" to establish MSYs as qualified by environmental factors) in
Article 5(b). However, several related Articles elaborate further on
what environmental measures states are to consider. Article 2 states,
"The objective of this Agreement is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks." Article 5 describes the ecological framework in
which states shall give effect to this goal. States shall
(d) adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for other species belonging to the same
ecosystem or dependent on or associated with the target
species, with a view to maintaining or restoring popula tions of such species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened;
(e) promote the development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and
techniques in order to minimize pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species . . . and impacts on ecologically related
species ... ;
(f) take into account the need for protecting biodiversity;
[and]
(g) take measures to eliminate over fishing and excess
fishing capacity. 52

Second, the Agreement gives considerable guidance as to what constitutes "over fishing" in its application of the precautionary principle.53 In so doing, the Agreement satisfactorily responds to considerable criticisms concerning previous applications of the precautionary principle in ocean regimes.
(26 August 1994); Commentary, "Draft Treary + Political Will = Hope for Global
Fisheries" (1994) 88 ECO 1.
52 The Agreement, article 5.
53 The principle has several definitions and, as will be discussed later, can be
interpreted to varying degrees of precaution. An acceptable definition includes two
notions: (i) that environmental control measures should not depend on or wait for
scientific certainty of cause-effect link; and (ii) the presumption that it is better to
err in decision-making on the side of caution. See VanderZwaag, supra note 50 at

46.
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The PAO notes that the precautionary principle has long been
advocated even though rarely applied in practice. 54 Moreover, when
the principle is applied, there is often a lack of certainty with
regard to the required control measures and levels of acceptable risk
because of absence of certainty in scientific data.55
Unlike previous applications of the term, the Agreement gives
substantial guidance to future IFOs and fishing states as to where the
principle shall be considered and to what degree. The draft
Agreement applies the precautionary principle as a general principle
underlying all conservation, management and exploitation measures
of straddling stocks (Article 6.1). As with Article 119 .1 of the
1982 Convention, Article 6.2 mandates that the "best scientific
evidence available" is to be used. However, in order to reduce interstate bickering regarding what is permissible evidence, the Article
continues by saying "States shall be more cautious when information
is poor. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and
management measures" (emphasis added).
The precautionary approach is explicitly to be used to set stockspecific minimum management standards, which Article 6.3b states
will take into account the realities of present scientific uncertainties
relating to the size and productivity of stocks, precautionary reference points, levels of mortality, and environmental and socio-economic conditions.
Importantly, Article 6.3d and Annex 2 establish guidelines for
determining precautionary reference points, and the type of immediate action to be taken if they are exceeded. Annex 2 advocates
strategies that constrain harvesting within safe biological limits, ensure limited risk of over-harvesting, and account for situations of
poor information on specific stocks by establishing provisional reference points to similar and better-known stocks.
Hence, in light of these provisions, "overfishing" would include
fishing above a cautious level when the information described above
is uncertain or inadequate. International acceptance of these provisions would clarify the "F.0.1" versus "Fmax" debate evident between NAFO and the EU in favour of NAFO. These provisions will
hopefully reduce such inter-member disputes for future IFOs.

54

Supra note 29 at 42.

55 VanderZwaag, supra note 50 at 49.
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Annex 2 has come under some criticism, however. Judith Swan,
an NGO representative at the UN Conference, states that participants
in the UN Conference inter-session "informal" meetings cannot determine how the principle would be applied in practice as it is
presently described in Annex 2.5 6 Though there is still confusion as
to its application, one should not lose sight of the fact that state
parties are examining the concept and trying to understand its proposed implementation. These factors bode well for the application
of the concept generally in fisheries management and specifically in
the UN Conference.
Article 6.2 constructively reverses the burden of proof between
science and decision-making fishery authorities; policy-makers and
industry officials can no longer argue real or pretended uncertainties in order to avoid difficult decisions. Instead, policy decisions
must be made on whatever scientific evidence is available or can be
provisionally referred to in order to set cautionary measures.57 As
the FAO notes, this practice is essential for effective anticipatory,
rather than reactive, management.
It should also be noted that the draft Agreement's interpretation of the precautionary principle does not threaten the viability of
the fishing industry because of the absence of certainty in fishery
data. This is in contrast to the stringent application of the precautionary principle advocated by the United States with regard to the
driftnet controversy.
The United States policy statement on Large-Scale Pelagic
Driftnets5 8 advocated a new standard in fishing, including an application of the precautionary principle that would preclude a particular fishery from proceeding unless it was shown that it could be
conducted without unacceptable impacts. Amongst other criticisms, William Burke finds this extreme interpretation of the principle and its application to the fishing industry unduly restrictive:
he believes this type of "precaution" would ensure the termination
56

J. Swan, Oceans Institute of Canada representative at the UN Conference, in a
personal interview with the author (8 November, 1994 at Dalhousie Law School,
Halifax, N.S.).
57 PAO, supra note 29 at 42.
58 U.S. Policy Statement: Kokechik v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795
(1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); U.S. Policy Statement on Large-Scale
Pelagic Driftnets 4 (submitted to the United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea, July 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Policy Statement] as found in
Burke, supra note 40.
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of fishing because "it is generally accepted that we are ignorant
about the abundance and distribution of target species and by
catch." 59
Moreover, this obligation is legally incompatible with the 1982
Convention which only calls for judgments concerning reference
points to be based on the "best scientific data available." In contrast
with the Driftnet proposal, the draft Agreement is consistent with
the 1982 Convention "best scientific data" standard in its application and use of the precautionary principle. Hence, it is more likely
to be acceptable to the international community.
The draft Agreement attempts to resolve the outstanding dispute with regard to the compatibility of conservation and management measures between coastal states and IF Os. Article 7 .1 states,
"Conservation and management measures taken on the high seas
and those taken in areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the stocks
overall." Several provisions indicate that the draft Agreement
largely recognizes the coastal states' contention that in determining
conservation measures for straddling stocks the coastal state should
have a superior position. Article 3 recognizes the sovereign nature of
EEZ rights when it states that the Agreement applies to stocks beyond the areas under national jurisdiction. Article 7 .1 reaffirms that
the Agreement does not prejudice states' sovereign rights.
Moreover, Article 7.2a states that in determining compatible conservation measures, coastal states and DWFSs shall "ensure that measures established in respect of the high seas do not undermine the
effectiveness of those established in respect of the same stock(s) by
coastal states in areas under national jurisdiction." This article recognizes the claim of coastal states that they have a special interest in
straddling stocks when the stock resides within EEZ limits for a
considerable period of its life cycle. The article also implies coastal
state superiority in the formulation of management measures if the
coastal state has pre-established measures, since the measures established for the high seas must not undermine the effectiveness of the
coastal state measures. Assuming that enclosure principles lead to

59 W. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and
Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 148; see Burke, supra note 40 at 258.
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more effective management measures, these provisions enhance the
probability of better management. Go
On the other hand, it is submitted that several provisions of the
Agreement also recognize the DWFss' claim that management measures should take into account the biological unity of specific
stocks. Where the stock in issue has a biological life cycle that is
rarely within the EEZ area, Article 7.2b can be interpreted to imply
that the stock's biological data should have equal weight when determining proper conservation measures. Article 7.2b states that all
parties shall
take into account the biological unity and other characteristics of the stock(s) and the relationship between the
distribution of the stock(s), the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region, including the extent to which the stock(s) occur and are fished in areas
under national jurisdiction.

Hence, in situations where the stock in issue resides mostly on the
high seas, DWFSs could argue that Article 7.2a (preference to the
coastal state) should not be enforced. Instead, conservation measures for such stocks should reflect their natural migratory patterns.
Article 7.2c recognizes another DWFS concern-that the dependence of DWFSs on fish stocks must be accounted for when determining management measures. Article 7.2c recognizes that dependencies are not limited to coastal state communities, but also include communities in DWFSS (such as the Basque in Spain) which
have significant proportions of their population working in tradi60 This presumption is under criticism, however, both in practice and as a
theoretical basis for establishing management measures. In practice, the history of
Canada's East Coast fishery after Canada's declaration of a 200 mile EFZ does little
to demonstrate that enclosure necessarily leads to a more rational management of
resources. After the 1977 announcement of Canada's EFZ, fishermen immediately
reaped the benefits of access to new resources. This led to an over stimulation of the
industry and over capacity on the East Coast. This has added, in part, to the present
crisis.
Theoretically, the presumption is under attack by advocates of the "common
heritage of mankind" theory, such as Peter Payoyo, who believe that reliance on a
theoretical basis that "divides the spoils" on the basis of exclusive property rights, is
bound to lead to incessant disagreement and limited success in effective
management of species. See above for further discussion of this argument, and P.
Payoyo "Fishing For the Common Heritage in Straddling and Highly-Migratory
Fish Stocks: A Case Study" (Oceans Institute, 1994) [unpublished].
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tional high seas fishery operations. Article 7 .2 states that. in determining compatible conservation and management measures, both
coastal states and states fishing on the high seas shall "take into account the respective dependence of the coastal State(s) and the
State(s) fishing on the high seas on the stock(s) concerned." Again,
although the coastal state's sovereign rights within its EEZ are not
infringed by this rule, there is an indirect qualification on the conservation measures to be established within the EEZ concerning
straddling stocks. The coastal state, in establishing conservation
measures for specified stocks, must take into account the interests
of DWFSS who harvest the same stock on the high seas.
Such limited infringements on EEZ sovereign rights may be perceived as qualifying coastal state sovereign EEZ management rights,
which will not be popular amongst many states. However, coastal
states should recognize that their long-term conservation goals are
better achieved through consistent and compatible measures on
straddling stocks, even if internal EEZ management rights might
potentially be restricted by high seas interests concerning the same
straddling stocks.
2. Rights and Duties of Relevant Authority Levels

i. IFOs
Part III of the Agreement provides guidelines for the establishment
of IFOs and a clarification of IFO enforcement powers. These characteristics are notably absent in Article 118 in the 1982 Convention.
Article 118 provides that
States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation
and management of living resources in the high seas ...
[and] as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional
or regional fisheries organizations to this end.

In contrast, the Agreement's Part III provisions explicitly strengthen
the role of IFOs; Article 8.3 states that states shall give effect to their
duty to cooperate in relation to straddling stock management by
participating in all established regional or subregional management
organization measures. Moreover, subparagraph 4 states that only
those states that participate in or abide by the measures of the relevant IFO "shall have access to the fishery." This provision, in conjunction with the dispute resolution procedures to be analyzed

24

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

shortly, provide a more effective legal mechanism to address nonIFO and IFO fishing vessels that do not abide by IFO policies.
Articles 9-12 elaborate in detail the structure and function of
future IFOs. These articles also emphasize the need to empower present IFOs. IFOs are to be established in conjunction with agreement
amongst relevant fishing parties on such factors as the stock(s) and
area to which the measures are to apply, and the mechanisms by
which the IFO will obtain scientific advice. Moreover, IFOs are to be
the forum for parties to establish and abide by procedures concerning scientific measures, monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. It should be emphasized that these guidelines are to be agreed upon as the IFO is being established, which
will reduce ambiguity of terms and procedures. This in turn should
eliminate any delay in members adopting rFo-determined effort
levels and other conservation measures once the IFO 's reference
points are established.

ii. Flag States
In order to be consistent with the 1982 Convention, the Agreement
maintains flag state responsibilities over vessels on the high seas.
However, in contrast to Article 117 of the 1982 Convention, which
states that it is the duty of flag states to ensure their nationals abide
by IFO measures, the Agreement provisions are extensively detailed
in the specific obligations to which a flag state must agree before its
nationals are permitted to fish in IFO managed regions. Article 17 .1
states that the flag state must ensure that its vessels comply with
regional conservation strategies. Reference to Articles 8.4 (limited
access) and 32 indicate that vessels must comply not only with the
strategies of IFOs of which they are members, but all established IFO
measures. Article 32. l clearly states:
Where a state does not participate in the work carried out
through a subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or arrangement, that state is not discharged
from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and
management of the relevant stock(s).

Subparagraph 2 goes further and states that
[a] state which does not cooperate with ... [an IFO] shall
not authorize vessels flying its flag to operate in fisheries
which are subject to conservation and management
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measures established by that organization or arrangement.

Article 17.2 states that no flag state shall authorize any vessels to
fish on high seas where it cannot effectively exercise its responsibilities which are detailed extensively in subparagraph 3. As is customary, enforcement provisions remain with the flag state; Article 18
requires the flag state to investigate any alleged violations by its nationals, and to expeditiously report back to the state alleging the
violation on the progress and outcome of the investigation.

iii. All States
Part IV constructively expands on Article 94.6 of the 1982
Convention which provides that a state with clear grounds to believe that control of foreign vessels is being exercised improperly
may report this fact to flag state. Article 20 gives foreign states
greater rights to enforce IFO conservation measures on foreign vessels. Article 20.2 encourages IFOs to establish agreed upon procedures for monitoring, enforcement and surveillance of vessels:
States shall agree on procedures under which the appropriate authorities of one state may board and inspect a
fishing vessel flying the flag of another state, including
notification requirements and procedures under which
one state might arrest and detain a fishing vessel flying
the flag of another state.

Subparagraph 3 enables similar boarding and inspection powers to
be developed by IFOs for vessels without nationality or flying "flags
of convenience." These provisions considerably enhance the powers
of foreign state and IFO officers to investigate, report, and even detain foreign vessels allegedly not abiding by the IFO measures.
Will such limitations on the traditional impunity of vessels on
the high seas be acceptable to DWFSs and maritime states? To be acceptable, the enforcement provisions must condone only acts of authority that are explicitly for the enforcement of IFO conservation
and management goals for certain straddling fish stocks. This provision should not be used to justify a coastal state's furtherance of
its domestic goals or interests. This key distinction must be clear. It
would appear that the draft Agreement provisions have achieved
this clarity.
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Presently, Part IV mandates that all states will be subject to
mutually agreed-upon IFO standards, and that any state with a reasonable ground for suspecting impropriety by another state can act
to enforce the IFO standards instead of relying on the flag state enforcement. If Part IV provisions were expanded so as to authorize
coastal state actions not explicitly connected to IFO measures, IFOs
could be viewed by DWFSs as permitting coastal state extensions of
jurisdictional authority. Such changes would compromise an IFo's
"neutral" nature as a forum for the resolution of coastal state-DWFS
disputes.
As stated, Part IV provisions should be acceptable to the international community as they condone only IFO-regulated infringements on flag-state sovereign rights. At present, Article 20.1 limits
enforcement powers on foreign vessels to powers exercised in accordance with IFO procedures. The provisions mandate effective enforcement but limit the use of the enforcement measures to problems concerning fishing specific stocks. Hence, the times when this
power will be legally used will be defined by individual IFOs so that
the powers reflect the particular characteristics of the straddling
stocks and IFO region.
Judith Swan states that Canada will not ratify the Agreement
until Article 20 includes a recognition that a coastal state can legislate emergency functional management measures to conserve
straddling stocks. 61 Canada should not seek recognition for coastal
states to act unilaterally to enforce conservation measures. Instead,
such actions should remain within the prerogative of neutral IFO
managers or member state officials who act in accordance with IFO
rules, as is endorsed in Article 20. Although Judith Swan is hopeful
that this amendment will be accepted prior to the fourth session,
Canada should qualify this demand since it is surely going to be a
"hard sell" with DWFSS.
The following is a qualification on Canada's proposal. 62 A
coastal state should only have to take "emergency" measures when
the IFO is ineffective in its enforcement role. In order for coastal
state "emergency enforcement powers" to be acceptable to DWFSs,
coastal states should accept that such an act would automatically
trigger a dispute settlement process whereby a straddling stock arbitral tribunal will evaluate the competing claims. The tribunal will
61

62

Swan, supra note 56.
This idea was discussed by the author during an interview with Swan, ibid.
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determine whether the legislation is genuinely aimed at reasonable
conservation measures or whether the legislation is truly a coastal
state attempt to promote its own interests in high seas fisheries.
This proposal has several advantages. First, it still gives the
coastal state the legal offensive, the right to act to prevent degradation of a resource or habitat when the IFO has not succeeded. This is
in accord with an anticipatory management philosophy. Second,
the proposal allows for DWFSs to have their arguments heard in order to determine the legitimacy of the legislation. Third, the use of
the same tribunal body will lead to a greater degree of expertise,
and hopefully, consistency in the tribunal's decision-making.
Eventually, this could establish a body of precedent concerning
"straddling stock issues,'' providing states with greater certainty as
to the legality of their actions. This ultimately could lessen interstate disputes.
3. Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes

Part VIII of the Agreement is ancillary to the procedures for the
settlement of disputes provided for in Part XV of the 1982
Convention. Since these provisions relate to institutional aspects of
the law of the sea they have not been tested through implementation. Hence, it is difficult to assess the further contribution made
by the Agreement's provisions.
A preliminary overview of the two mechanisms reveals several
similarities. Both provisions state that parties have an obligation to
settle and encourage parties to use conciliation proceedings or to establish mutually agreed upon ad hoc expert panels to resolve the
disputed matter expeditiously. Article 28(3) of the Agreement
dearly states that all parties to a dispute, regardless of whether they
are members of IFOs, are subject to the 1982 Convention provisions
when negotiations fail. For those states that are members of or participants in an IFO, Article 29 mandates IFO members to establish,
strengthen or adapt to the new dispensation internal dispute settlement procedures. If acted on, such arrangements will assure a more
timely and effective resolution of disputes.
The Agreement does propose several novel additions to the dispute resolution process. First, several provisions propose judicial
procedures specifically created for straddling stock issues. The
Agreement sets out a detailed arbitration procedure, found in
Annex III, which is a model for interested states to use when estab-
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lishing their own settlement mechanisms. Annex III also is the basis
for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for resolving straddling
and highly migratory stock conflicts. Article 30.2 provides the tribunal with jurisdiction to prescribe provisional measures to prevent
damage to the stock(s) in question or to preserve the respective
rights of the parties to the dispute.
The proposed arbitral tribunal has several improvements on the
International Court of Justice (!CJ). Whereas Churchill and Lowe63
note that the ICJ has the disadvantage that the parties are not
wholly free to determine the composition of the Court, 64 the proposed arbitral tribunal procedures mandate that of the three tribunal members, one will be appointed within a limited time by
each party to the dispute, and the third (the President) will be mutually agreed upon. 65
It is hoped that these changes will result in greater party acceptance of the dispute resolution process. Hitherto, the dispute resolution process has not been popular among states. Moreover, as the
tribunal is specialized in regard to straddling stock issues, the tribunal decisions will lead to greater uniformity in decision-making
on straddling stock issues throughout the world.
A second feature of the arbitral tribunal is that though its provisional measures may be modified or revoked with a change of the
circumstances justifying them, this can only be done after the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard. Again, this feature
prevents unilateral actions by states in taking advantage of the uncertainty of facts concerning fishery management. For example, a
state might otherwise claim that, according to its scientific evidence, the circumstances justifying the measures have changed so
that the measures are no longer needed, and the state might order a
resumption of its prohibited activities.
The provisions also emphasize the need for timely and expeditious decision-making procedures, not only within the IFO (see
Articles 26, 29), but also in situations where IFO procedures fail, or
63 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 14 at 333.
64 It should be noted that a party to a dispure at the ICJ does have some choice of
the judiciary; a party has the right to appoint a judge of its choosing if there is no
judge of its nationality on the bench. Ibid. at 333.
65 Article 3 of Annex 3 states provides that if the President has not been
designated within twenty-one days, the President of the International Tribunal of
the LOS shall appoint the President of the arbitral tribunal.
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are non-existent, and parties must resort to the use of provisional or
Part XV measures (see Articles 30.6). The time limitations
increase the likelihood that disputes will be resolved.

4. Resolution of Allocation Issues
In contrast to the improvements noted above, the Agreement does
not substantively address allocation issues. In the present draft,
Article 1Ob states that allocation issues will be addressed through
regional fishery bodies. Article 16, which addresses a critical issue
related to allocation, new participants, similarly does no more than
list a number of interested parties that states shall take into account
when determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for
new members of IFOs.
Two previous draft agreements at the Conference have been
criticized by Peter Payoyo for their failure to resurrect and address
squarely the allocation issue. 66 Payoyo posits that allocation issues
must be addressed first and foremost if the international community wishes to truly resolve the fishery crisis. "Who gets how much
of what, and why" must be resolved. 67 Without answers to these
questions, Payoyo believes, biological conservation attempts by
concerned parties will not be practically made. Payoyo contends
that allocation issues can best be resolved by working within the
theoretical norm of the "common heritage of humankind," which
advocates that all high seas natural resources "must be developed,
administered, conserved, and distributed on the basis of international cooperation and for the benefit of all mankind." 68
Payoyo believes that such an approach could reduce problems of
resource allocation. Whereas under the current draft agreement,
allocation problems are characterized as competing state property
claims to fish, he suggests that a common heritage of mankind
framework would re-orient the issues so they become "non-property" claims. After such a regulation, IFOs would not be regulators
(as under the present regime), but instead "trustees" of high seas resources. IFO managers would distribute resources according to a
common heritage approach involving the sharing of international
Payoyo, supra note 60.
Ibid at4-5.
Ibid. at 9, citing Article III(5) of the "Draft Ocean Space Treaty" (Malta,
UN Doc. A/AC.138/53 (August 1971)) (paper submitted by Malta to the UN
Seabed Committee in August 1971).
66
67
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revenues among relevant participants with special emphasis on developing countries receiving funds for their development. 69
It is difficult to dispute with Payoyo that the present draft
agreement does little to address exactly how states or IFOs are to
determine who gets access to resources. However, the nature of,
and circumstances which have brought about, the UN Conference
must be taken into the equation. Once this is done, the Agreement
can and should be defended.
The present document is a last-ditch attempt to save the concept of international fishery bodies as managers of straddling
stocks. Like-minded coastal states united to realize their common
goals at the Conference. Moreover, several members of the "Core
Group" (including at present Canada, Chile, Iceland, Argentina,
New Zealand, Norway and Peru) proposed to adopt unilateral
measures to control high seas fishing should the Conference not
achieve an acceptable result.7°
The Agreement is arguably an action document. It brings substance to the provisions of the 1982 Convention in order to achieve
the latter Convention's mandate of establishing IFOs to manage
straddling stocks. It does this in explicit terms. The Conference
must define principles as well as strengthen and clarify IFO powers
in order to provide immediate, effective guidelines. This is its
mandate, and, as argued above, it seems to have largely satisfied its
objectives.
The purpose of the UN Conference makes the application of a
concept such as the "common heritage of mankind" unsuitable. The
concept, though potentially beneficial in the long term in achieving
a more equitable allocation of resources, is neither well understood
nor accepted by the international community as a framework for
discussion of living resource allocation.7 1
69

Ibid. at 36, 39-40.

Meltzer, supra note 4 at 327.
Payoyo himself admits that benefit-sharing must "somehow re-enter the main
currents of policy discussion" (supra note 60 at 44). In addition to not being a
"highly debated idea in the 1990s" the concept is in conflict with the relatively
recent incorporation of the EEZ concept into international customary law.
Moreover, the concepts application in Part XI of the 1982 Convention has been
curtailed in the proposed "Draft Resolution and Draft Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 UN Convention" (15 April 1994). This
resolution is awaiting 40 signatures before being adopted to operate in conjunction
with the rest of the 1982 Convention.
70
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In summary, although the "common heritage of humankind"
concept is noble, including it as a framework for the resolution of
immediate disputes and crises would spell the end of the u N
Conference and jeopardize the future viability of IFOs.

VIII. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The UN Conference meets its objectives. The above analysis reveals
that the 1982 Convention mandate for the establishment of IFOs
has been comprehensively advanced in the Agreement. The provisions clarify the requirements for and characteristics of an effective
IFO management structure. This will aid in the establishment of future IFOs. The provisions also strengthen IFO state member powers
in order to rectify the historical ineffectiveness of IFOs such as
NAFO.

IX. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
The current international context in which the UN Conference is
being held indicates that the Agreement will be affirmed. The
threats of unilateral action are real. The Canadian government
unanimously adopted legislation to take enforcement action to protect straddling stocks outside Canada's EFZ in the NAFO Regulatory
Area. Moreover, Canada's seriousness in taking such unilateral action is revealed by its simultaneous amendment to its acceptance of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Hague. It has done this
to preclude any challenge which might undermine Canada's ability
to protect the stocks by taking the temporary emergency actions it
has. 72 Another member of the "Core Group," Chile, has announced
its consideration of a Presential Sea, which would extend coastal
state authority to high seas areas adjacent to the EEZ to permit
functional management of a vast ocean area in the absence of other
regulatory authority and while international negotiations are
underway.7 3
72 Government of Canada, Press Release NR-HQ-94-30E, "Canada Takes
Action to End Foreign Over fishing" (10 May 1994).
73 See generally F. 0. Vicuna, "Toward an Effective Management of High Seas
Fisheries and the Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea" (1993) 24
0.D.I.L. 81 at 88. For a critical analysis of the Presential sea concept, see Joyner,
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Not surprisingly, DWFSs and maritime nations such as the
United States find such unilateral acts to be unorthodox and highly
disruptive, for they have the potential to devolve the oceans regime
into what Edward Miles calls a "national lakes approach to ocean
regime[s] ."74 Since more extensive unilateral acts are the real alternative to a treaty agreement, DWFSS are more likely to accept the
Agreement, including its limitations on the traditional monopoly of
a flag state's authority over its nationals. This position is evident in a
recent United States Department of Defense paper advocating that
the United States become a party to the 1982 Convention.75 The
Department finds that the Convention as a whole establishes an
ocean regulatory regime that is in the national security interests of
the United States.7 6 Since the Agreement endorses international
organizational management of high seas resources, provides mandatory dispute resolution procedures, and reinforces the dear set of
maritime zone boundaries established in the 1982 Convention, it is
arguable that these aspects of the Agreement contribute to a stable
oceans regime. Consequently, it is in the interests of the United
States, with its global military and commercial interests, to ratify
the Agreement and the 1982 Convention.
It is also foreseeable that the dispute with regard to the nature
of the Agreement is likely to be resolved. During the present intersession at the UN Conference, officials for the United States and the
EU indicated that they perceive the present negotiations as a means
to create a binding legal document. 77 If these comments are accepted by other DWFSs, this will be a considerable "victory" for
coastal states. It will also increase the chances of the Agreement's
provisions being implemented.
Furthermore, states throughout the world are increasingly recognizing the "global" nature of their actions and the need for more
concerted international cooperative action. This fact is evident in
the keen interest taken by states at the UNCED Conference and in
the numerous FAO and UN Conferences on the implementation of

Jr. "Mar Presencial (The Presential Sea): Deja vu all
over again?-A Response to Francisco Orrego Vicuna" (1993) 24 O.D.I.L. 93.
7 4 E. L. Miles, "Preparations for UNCLOS rv?" (1988) 19 O.D.I.L. 421 at 426.
75 United States of America, Department of Defense, "National Security and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" Quly 1994) [unpublished
paper].
76 Ibid at i.
77 Swan, supra note 56.
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the various resolutions agreed to at UNCED. IFOs represent a real and
potentially effective forum in which states can realize the need for
greater international cooperation.
Recent conciliatory actions in NAFO reveal further hope. In 1992
the EU ceased fishing northern cod on the Nose of the Grand Banks
and has agreed to accept all NAFO conservation decisions. In late
1993 NAFO imposed further moratoria on stocks on the Tail of the
Grand Banks so as to be in accord with the moratoria imposed by
Canada. 78
Most importantly, the Agreement's ratification is in the interest
of distant-water fishing, maritime and coastal states. Ratification
will clarify and bolster the legal oceans regime. In contrast, refusal
to ratify will seriously undermine the 1982 Convention's goal of
order and conservation of ocean resources. Refusal to ratify will also
leave Canada and other coastal states with the option of taking further unilateral action. Although such acts seem beneficial in the
sense that they have an immediate impact on foreign fishing activities, they are only temporary measures: a unilateral act is only effective if the nation can enforce its claim. Moreover, for nations
such as Canada, which are highly dependent on international trade,
unilateral acts could affect other vital interests. Hence, if Canada
continues to take unilateral action, its international trade with
Japan, the United States, and the EU could be affected by retaliatory measures.
In contrast, the UN Conference provides an opportunity to bolster the powers of IFOs which can act as a neutral arena for the competing claims and interests of coastal states and DWFSs. The history
of NAFO reveals that the legal structure in which IFOs gained their
management and enforcement authority was deficient. The
Agreement gives the legal opportunity to rectify and clarify the
roles and powers of presently existing and future IFOS. The
Agreement also moves towards a reduction in the tension between
coastal states and DWFSs with its emphasis on the mutual interest
that both parties share in straddling fish stocks, and the larger
ecosystem in which the stocks are exploited.

78 Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-19, "The Fisheries Crisis in
the Northwest Atlantic" Qune 1994).

